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Abstract
Religious diversity and pluralism is increasing all over the world, and globalization is 
creating a widespread awareness of that. The growing influence of religions in public 
politics and culture around the world is contradicting conventional narratives of secu-
larization. Indeed, the resurgence of religions in all the continents is tangled in different 
ways to modernization processes. The main argument of this chapter is that this religious 
change toward pluralism can be fully understood in the context of multiple modernities 
theory, provided that it be revised and modified. The key understanding of changes must 
come from a better insight of popular religions worldwide. Latin American, Eastern Asia 
and Islam regions are good examples of popular forms of religious revitalization that 
contrasts with the Northern European case. New ways of producing sense and spiri-
tual search in non-Western areas are framing specific relationships between religion and 
modernities and bringing about pluralisms. The interweaving of old and new religious 
traditions is accentuating interculturality and is generating great conditions for the emer-
gence of new types of syncretism and/or sociocultural and even material (and violent) 
conflicts. The consequence is the development of religious patterns within societies that 
have a specific and distinctively form of modernity of their own.
Keywords: popular religions, religious pluralism, multiple modernities, new theories of 
religion, non-Western religions
1. Introduction
Religious diversity and pluralism is increasing all over the world. In fact, religious, rich diver-
sity and plurality are abounding within religions in the world—diversity in both belief and 
praxis—and globalization is creating a widespread awareness of that [1].
© 2018 The Author(s). Licensee IntechOpen. This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative
Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0), which permits unrestricted use,
distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
One of the main influences on recent social theory of religion has been the growing influence 
of religious institutions in public politics and culture around the world [2]. During the twen-
tieth century, the vast majority of Western social theorists had predicted that religion was in 
decline. Nevertheless the different conventional narratives of secularization have been con-
tradicted by the resurgence of religions—Islam, Hinduism, Christianity—in all the continents 
interwoven in different ways to modernization processes ([3], pp. 97, 98).
In the Christian world, not only popular Pentecostalism or Neo-Pentecostalism, but other 
Evangelicals and independent churches as well, are expanding in Latin America, Africa and 
many Asian countries [4]. New forms of relationship between religion and public sphere are 
emerging and non-affiliated religious expressions are increasing in the West. Within Islam 
and Eastern Asian, and Latin American contexts popular religions are lasting, and even invig-
orating the religious fields. African and ethnic religions are present in transcultural contexts 
as well as popular forms of Buddhism and eastern religions. New age tendencies are spread 
all over different continents. New transnational religious movements [5] and old revitalized 
indigenous religions [6] are emerging in the globalized world. The most successful refigura-
tion of religions and spiritualities flourishes by drawing themselves down into mass soci-
ety through new technologies of communication and migrations of people and ideas leaving 
aside elitist expressions of religions.
The main argument of this chapter is that these religious changes toward pluralism can be 
fully understood in the context of multiple modernities theory [7–10] provided that it be 
revised and modified. A new sociological approach is needed. The classical sociological con-
cepts and theories, beginning with secularization, must be criticized and replaced with a more 
complex theoretical view. Latin American, African and Asian historical processes must be 
compared with what is happening in different regions of the world and not only with the 
West. World religions are answering each one by their own path to multiple interactions with 
modernities. The key understanding of changes must come from a better insight of popu-
lar religions worldwide. Latin American, Eastern Asia and Islam regions are good examples 
of popular forms of religious revitalization that contrasts with the Northern European case. 
They put in evidence the fact that new ways of producing sense and spiritual search in non-
Western geo-cultural areas are framing specific relationships between religion and moderni-
ties and bringing about new religious pluralisms.
The theoretical and methodological perspective is guided by a conceptual discussion and 
is based on recent historical and sociological analyses. The critical appraisal of secondary 
sources and authors who have written recently on the subject is the base of the main set of 
arguments put forward.
The chapter begins with an introduction and a theoretical discussion on multiple modernities 
and religion. Section 2 develops a general overview of religious evolution and statistics in the 
world today. Section 3 goes in deep on the concepts of popular religion and gathers sound 
data and interpretative approaches to popular religions in Latin America, Eastern Asia and 
Islamic milieu and in comparative terms with Industrialized Western countries. The texts end 
with a proposal of a new sociological approach of the subject trying to overcome the classical 
and predominant paradigm on religion and modernity.
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The main interpretative scope of the chapter comes from the three decades experience of the 
author doing research and publishing scientific works on popular religion, mainly on the 
Latin American sociohistorical recent evolution. The critical appraisal of the predominant 
Western-oriented theories of religions is extended to analyze non-Western contexts such as 
Islam, and Eastern Asian popular religions in countries submitted to rapid modernization 
processes.
2. Multiple modernities and religions
In search for a theoretical interpretation of this phenomenon, Eisenstadt’s theory of multiple 
modernizations [7, 8] reveals insightful. This theory allows us to criticize the classical evolu-
tionary theory of linear and Eurocentric modernization that would drive us directly to secu-
larization. It allows to understand the sociohistorical, ideological and institutional contexts 
that have given rise to different forms of modernities in the world last century.
Eisenstadt states that:
“The crystallization of modernity has indeed greatly changed or transformed the basic characteristics 
of political centers and dynamisms. From the point of view of the contents of these centers, the major 
transformation which has occurred concomitantly with modernity has been the growing seculariza-
tion of the centers, and the nonacceptance of the givenness of their contents and symbols can indeed 
be reexamined anew. This change was closely connected with the growing autonomy of the political, 
cultural, and societal centers, and above all with changes in the relations between the centers and the 
periphery; with the growing impingement of the periphery on the center and by facilitation of the access 
to the center by the periphery, by the permeation of the periphery by the center, often culminating in 
the concomitant tendency toward the obliteration of the differences between center and periphery” ([8], 
pp. 262-263).
Notwithstanding in recent decades we have observed the resurgence of greater differences 
between the center and the peripheries in religious terms. Meanwhile, Western societies, espe-
cially Europe, remain the epitome of secularization, a set of non-institutional expressions of 
religiosities and spiritualities with diffuse frontiers of the post-axial type have been gener-
ated and expanding, all over the peripheries and even in the North American experience, 
including such secular components as the nation or person that have been re-sacralized, gen-
erating not a few symbolic cleavages [11].
This theory is useful to understand current changes of religions in the world, and it is an 
invitation to delve into the consequences of his analysis for the theory of secularization [12]. 
The logical consequence of the theory of multiple modernities applied to religion is that there 
are and will be diverse processes of ‘multiple secularizations’ [13]. Indeed secularization must 
be understood as a complex process and not a lineal one that will be followed by all societies 
experiencing the modernizing processes. Globalization leaves footprints and affects in its own 
religious evolution [14].
The approach of Eisenstadt is multidimensional and wide-ranging. It puts the emphasis 
on institutional and ideological dimensions of historical processes worldwide. The critics 
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received are because it does not take into account economic aspects. Additionally, it has been 
considered conceptually flawed and empirically unfounded [15]. It is based on the center-
periphery theory, but does not delve into the colonial and neocolonial conflict that it implies. 
It does not give relevance to the unequal distribution of power in sociocultural phenomena, 
not considering either conflicting interests and ideologies in contemporary societies.
Some dynamics of current globalization are neglected in Eisenstadt’s approach [16]. Global-
ization during the last century has given enough examples of growing inequalities that accen-
tuate social conflicts [17, 18]. In fact, the uneven development of capitalism with its dialectics 
of north/south and center/periphery, together with the hegemonic globalization, raises the 
resistance of local or ‘glocal’ identities [19, 20]. All these dynamics affect religious evolution 
and its expressions in different geo-cultural areas of the contemporary world.
Whether born out of poverty, the precariousness of life (unemployment, instability, economic 
crisis, debts, risks for the future, etc.), violence, social discrimination or new marginaliza-
tion, new religious movements are leading to traditional religious fervor, traditional or new 
popular religiosities, and new fundamentalist movements. Either the processes of forced, 
authoritarian, modernization generate uprisings of nonconformity, or the cultural modern-
izations affect traditions and customs and generate discontent, claiming cultural identity [18] 
and generate political motives for mobilizations everywhere. Within these identity claims the 
religious factor can be relevant. It is not surprising that messianic, clerical, new apocalyptical, 
or new esoteric movements support and are interwoven with anti-globalization movements 
or discontents. Trying to protect their dignity people pray to God or supernatural beings that 
can help them to survive and develop.
The search for meaning is present in popular religions as the result of the cry of the subaltern 
classes burned by the unequal system and by the institutional and political crisis. Overcoming 
alienation of consumer society, violence or injustice, triggers new ways of constructing the 
sense of life and cosmos. The millenarian or apocalyptical tendencies of old or new religious 
movements have its roots in this type of rationale.
Although multiple modernities give us a conceptual key for understanding what is happening 
in these religious changes in Latin America there must be at least two other remarks. The first 
one is that the world religions are answering each one by their own path to multiple interac-
tions with modernities. The example of the answers given by Catholicism in one side, and 
Islamism in the other, is clear. So, the thesis that they all tend to respond in similar ways to the 
challenge of multiple modernities [3] must be left aside. The second complementary remark 
is that in each civilizational area the processes of religious transformations are very different. 
Secularization tendencies can be present in diverse scenarios although there are diverse reli-
gious responses. We observe different types of religious genuine transformations. ‘This trans-
formation little by little acquires its own characteristics as a function of historical dynamics, 
structural conditioning and traditions, evolutions and constructions proper’ [21] to the cultures 
and peoples of Latin America, Asia, Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa. Religions are being 
transformed in northern developed countries (for example, Northern Western Europe) with the 
diminishing importance of public and personal religious practices. In southern countries and 
Culture and Identity94
in developing countries (as in Latin America, Africa, Asia), however, religions are being revi-
talized according to their specific sociohistorical conditions within their cultural peculiarities.
3. Religions: statistics and evolution in the world today
What now seems indisputable is that the old paradigm of secularization has been surpassed. 
The debate now focuses on whether it should be replaced by the theory of post-secularization 
or by that of neo-secularization [22]. What is decisive is that recent data and estimates from 
surveys and centers of research are indicating that the great world religions are not disap-
pearing, and instead religions in general, except Buddhists and other religions, are tending to 
increase the number of members they draw [23] (Table 1).
By 2060, [24] Christians are expected to reach 31.8% of the global population; Muslims 31.3%, 
Hindus 14.5, Buddhists 4.8 and Folk Religions 4.6. Unaffiliated population is supposed to 
reach only 12.5% while today it represents 16%.
We must acknowledge that religious affiliation is a dynamic phenomenon. Religious switch-
ing plays a role in religions growth and the changing sizes of religious groups. Those people 
born in the context of one religion might abandon his/her mother’s faith. Changes can go in 
different and even contrary directions. For example, PEW estimates for the period 2015–2020 
[25] show that about 5 million people globally are expected to become Christians in this five-
year period. At the same time around 13 million are expected to leave Christianity, probably 
to join the ranks of the religiously unaffiliated.
Projected 
population
% of world 
population
Projected 
population
% of world 
population
Population growth
2015 2015 2060 2060 2015–2060
Christians 2,276,250,000 31.2 3,054,460,000 31.8 778,210,000
Muslims 1,752,620,000 24.1 2,987,390,000 31.1 1,234,770,000
Unaffiliated 1,165,020,000 16.0 1,202,300,000 12.5 37,280,000
Hindus 1,099,110,000 15.1 1,392,900,000 14.5 293,790,000
Buddhists 499,380,000 6.9 461,980,000 4.8 −37,400,000
Folk religions 418,280,000 5.7 440,950,000 4.6 22,670,000
Other religions 59,710,000 0.8 59,410,000 0.6 −29,0000
Jews 14,270,000 0.2 16,370,000 0.2 2,100,000
World 7,284,640,000 100.0 9,615,762,060 100.0 2,331,130,000
Source: Pew Research Center [24].
Table 1. Size and projected growth of major religious groups (2015–2060).
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Age and fertility are other major factors behind religious changes. Contrasting the great fer-
tility rate of Muslim populations (that evidence a clear growth tendency for this religion), 
people who do not identify with any religion are probably reducing its relative size world-
wide due to the dearth of newborns among the unaffiliated population (that lives mostly in 
developed central countries).
Some religions are expected to increase their number of members over the next decades, 
including Islam, which will represent 30% of the world population by 2050 [25]; 31.1% by 2060 
[24]. Islam is strong and widespread in Arab countries, non-Arab countries such as Turkey, 
Iran, Pakistan and Bangladesh, and in many South Asian and Southeast Asian countries 
(Muslims are a strong majority in Indonesia and Malaysia, for example).
Christianity will increase its numbers in Sub-Saharan Africa by 2050 and worldwide; inde-
pendent churches of various denominations and forms of Pentecostalism will have increased, 
mainly in Latin America, Africa and the East (Asia and Oceania). The influence of Christianity 
on the lives of individuals is increasing in many places, and it remains strong in the USA but 
is expected to have decreased in relative terms in North America by 2050.
Hinduism will prevail in India and Nepal, and as a strong minority in many other Asian 
nations. Buddhism, Judaism, folk and ethnic religions, Shinto, Confucianism, and many other 
religions that are widespread in specific contexts are to grow slightly or to decline slightly.
In all the estimates that are made those without religious affiliation seem destined to decline 
by 2050 (from 16% in 2010 to 13% by the middle of the century, to 12.5% by 2060). It is expected 
that the so-called ‘none’s’ (atheists, agnostics, those indifferent and others) will suffer the 
impact of this wave of religious growth.
The important conclusion of the Center for the Study of Christianity at Gordon-Conwell 
Global Theological Seminar of South Hamilton (Massachusetts) in the United States is that 
by 2030 the religious affiliation of the population will be higher than in 1970: the figures are 
80.8% in that year and 90.2% in 2030. Religions ‘do not tend to disappear, as some authors 
used to predict beginning from the 1960s [23].
Although it is very important to assess religious changes, these religious statistics and socio-
religious demography lack precision and understanding of real religious changes that are 
taking place deep in the mentality of the masses and under the surface of the figures. Indeed 
we know that statistical invisibility can become the basis of religious discrimination [26].
Great dynamics of religious shifts are left aside or underestimated by the figures. On the one 
side, there is: (a) the loss of the influence of religions, mainly Christianity, in economic affairs, 
political and legal issues, and even personal morality in many industrialized countries in the 
West; (b) the diminishing power of institutionalized religions (churches) over society in general 
and even their own faithful in many Western-oriented countries. On the other side, in a counter 
movement, there is the increasing phenomenon of: (a) believers without religious affiliation in 
many regions of the world; (b) the double affiliation of people in many diverse religious contexts; 
(c) the revitalization of many types of popular religions (traditional and new), especially in non-
Western countries and regions; (d) the global religious resurgence aimed at recovering a reli-
gious foundation for the organization of society in the face of a modernization process that has 
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failed (especially after the fall of the Berlin Wall and in the Islamic civilization that now intends 
to ‘Islamize modernity’); and (e) the changing patterns of religious systems—including religious 
reforms and revitalizations—in different regions of the non-Western world (the Islamic world 
and Latin America, each with its imprints and idiosyncrasies, being good contrasting examples).
These facts make us realize that in reality what happens is that the specific religious evolu-
tions depend much on the regional (or continental) history, culture and religious dynamics. 
Depending on the type of analysis employed, one can identify at least nine great religious/
civilizational or geo-cultural areas in the world today: Western Europe; Eurasia (Central-
Eastern-Europe and North-Center Asia); North America; Latin America and the Caribbean; 
Middle East-Arabia; Indo-Asia; South-East and East Asia; Sub-Saharan Africa; Oceania. The 
hypothesis that these geo-cultural-religious areas of the world correspond to different pro-
cesses of modernizations can be sustained—mutatis mutandis—in historical, cultural and sta-
tistical terms.1 We can presume that in each religious/civilizatory area we will find specific 
religious field dynamics driven by the main world religious traditions historically spread 
through the region for centuries and the peculiar arrangements between religions and soci-
ety in each case through the modernization processes from the eighteenth century onwards, 
including colonization and neo-colonization processes and the attempts toward decoloniza-
tion in the nineteenth and twentieth century.
4. Popular religions of the world today
Social sciences have recognized the historical trend—in many cultural areas and world reli-
gions—in the formation of a widespread ‘popular religion’ related and subordinated to an 
‘official religion’. Under, and in a dialectical tension with, the official religion a popular reli-
gion with its own manifestations is developed [29]. Official and popular religions interact in a 
complex way: they share a lot of things, they are mutually attracted and repelled; they inter-
sect and differ and take distances, and they are constantly providing feedback to each other, 
although in a permanently asymmetric relationship.
Here ‘popular’ does not mean fashionable or in vogue, nor massive or related to media cul-
ture, as the expression in English is usually used. Popular designates the expressions of ordi-
nary people’s faith and the search for relationships with the divine (or the supernatural) in 
an individual or communitarian way—in a more direct and effective way—in their everyday 
lives. They are religious expressions often found in less privileged classes and groups. The 
body and iconic expressions take an outstanding role in this less intellectual and dogmatic 
type of religiosity. New forms of religiosity, mostly spiritualities that democratize mysticism, 
are spreading all over the world [30].
1Considering the World Value Survey database [27], Smith and Vaidyanathan [12] and Huntington [28]. The latter 
author’s hypothesis about the ‘clash of civilizations’ takes into account that we are not moving toward a unified world: 
language and religion worldwide is diversifying. The author suggests that this diversification among civilizations is a 
threat to peace and calls for a revitalization of the West. As he affirms: ‘Modernization, instead, strengthens those cul-
tures and reduces the relative power of the West. In fundamental ways, the world is becoming more modern and less 
Western’ ([28], p. 78).
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Popular religion can be understood as a set of local and massive religious expressions where 
simple lay people practice their heterodox rituals and beliefs related to a universal religious 
system. In all the world religions we find historical expressions of popular religion, although 
with many serious differences.
Generally speaking, the singular concept of popular religion is used. In conceptual terms it is 
an ideal type, though the historical and empirical phenomenon of the multiple and multitu-
dinous forms of religiosities and varied expressions must be acknowledged. This is why we 
speak here in plural terms of popular religions.
As it can be demonstrated we can find diverse expressions of popular religion in the different 
forms of Christianity, Judaism, and with other traits than found in Western cultures, in Islam, 
and in Eastern cultures, Buddhism, Hinduism, Daoism and other Asian religions.
Beyond the religious multicolored landscape printed by local and ancient traditions, the 
popular religions of Latin America, Africa and Asia seem to share common features: attach-
ment to life, perception of evil, dynamisms and symbolisms, the presence of the extraordi-
nary (e.g. miracles), and their distance, more or less accentuated, from Western thought and 
rationality.
In each case the features of popular religion will depend on the specificities of the historical-
cultural area traditions; the cultures and local religious traditions; the institutional develop-
ment of the religious macro-field; the evolution of local social structures and power; and the 
types of cross-cutting interethnic or intercultural encounters to which they have been sub-
jected historically.
5. Latin America and popular religions
Latin America—a peripherical continent in world context—in religious terms is increasingly 
plural. The religious field that was some decades ago totally Catholic has changed radically. 
Catholics percentage has diminished, and Evangelicals have grown considerably in recent 
years. The classical interaction between religion and society, and between religion and poli-
tics in this continent has been replaced by new forms of religions in the public sphere. The 
revitalization of religions—especially in terms of Pentecostals and charismatics; ethnic and 
indigenous religions; believers not affiliated, etc.—in public and private spaces reveals the 
changes that have taken place in Latin America’s cultural evolution since the nineteenth cen-
tury [31–33]. We observe in this context popular religions that are revitalized where millions 
of Latin American devotees go on pilgrimage each year to ask favors of their saints and the 
Virgin Mary and crowds take part in Pentecostal rituals.
The renewed religious landscape can serve us as a paradigm in comparative terms. The 
processes of secularization in developed central countries—especially in Western Europe—
have privatized beliefs and practices, specialized functions and reduced church influence. In 
contrast, Churches have now less influence than before and in all Latin American countries 
church and state have been separated for a long period, and religion continues to be a  relevant 
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part of the cultural landscape. In Latin America the privileged, educated (high or upper 
middle class) social groups have been secularized, but the vast majority of the middle and 
lower classes are adepts of rituals and popular cults, Catholics, Evangelicals or Pentecostals, 
including in some countries indigenous and/or African-Americans cults. The macro-religious 
field has been pluralized and diversified across various sociocultural Latino contexts, in line 
with the globalization of communications and knowledge, and the modernization processes 
undertaken in the region.
There have been many studies on popular religion in Latin America [32, 34, 35]. It is perhaps 
one of the main characteristic features (certainly not the only one) of Latin American culture 
and it defines, in a specific way, its cultural identity in the context of multiple modernities and 
the new landscape of religious diversity [36].
According to recent data on Latin America, nearly 50% of the population say in their religious 
services that speaking in tongues, praying for a miraculous healing and prophesying are com-
mon practices. The percentages are 86% for Protestants and 49% for Catholics. This type of 
religious expressions is linked to what has been called charismatics. In 15 countries (out of 18) 
Protestants practice it by more than 80%. In 12 countries (out of 18) Catholics practice charis-
matics by more than 50%.
We must add to this type of ritual a great population that takes part in popular religion ritu-
als. Sometimes popular religion and charismatics overlap, nonetheless there are also disjoint 
sets of popular religion in its own and pure charismatic expressions. There is no doubt that 
popular Catholicism continues to be one of the main expressions of religious belief in the 
continent. There are numerous shrines to the Virgin Mary throughout Latin America, from 
Mexico to Tierra del Fuego. Each year millions of pilgrims, from four million pilgrims for the 
Virgin of Guadalupe in Mexico to half a million pilgrims for the Virgin of Tirana in northern 
Chile, visit these. These are devotional expressions of colonial origin maintained in the midst 
of modernity. The Virgin of Copacabana, of colonial Andean origin (1583), on Lake Titicaca, 
remains vital as one of the most important devotional sites in Bolivia. Others may be men-
tioned: Caacupe (Paraguay), Caridad del Cobre (Cuba), Aparecida (Brazil), Lujan (Argentina), 
Chiquinquirá (Colombia), Coromoto (Venezuela), Alta Gracia (Dominican Republic), Del 
Rosario (Guatemala), Santa María de la Antigua (Panama), etc.
Together with charismatics (either Pentecostal or Catholic), there are a great number of devo-
tees of popular rituals. These expressions flourish in the Latino culture with its carnivals, foot-
ball fans and the mood of festivities, with their counterpart in sorrow, suffering and violence 
[37]. Many of the everyday lives and cultural manifestations of the Latin American people 
are then guided by a symbolic logic of action, an ‘other logic’ [32] that has been denied by the 
Latin American elites with their Western-oriented codes.
One dimension of popular religion is that it helps to shape identities to different groups 
whose position in society is negatively privileged [38]. Popular religion often accompanies 
forms of cultural resistance of non-Western peoples to the modernization that damages their 
traditions. The popular religion then contributes to resisting the various forms of exploitative 
and enslaving capitalism, restoring dignity and hope to ordinary people.
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The critical review of current manifestations of religious Latin American pluralism, the loss 
of influence of institutional expressions (churches) and the increasing development of charis-
matic manifestations and different spiritualities, the growing presence of popular and ‘lived 
religion’ not only have to do with the crisis of many churches and the disaffection toward 
institutions, also with the influence of new symbolic languages, rituals and body-oriented 
practices whose vector has been the modernization process itself. What Latin American popu-
lar religions are showing in many aspects raises questions and suggests new ways of inter-
preting religious phenomena in the globalized world.
The features of Catholicism in the popular Christian Latin area (Latin America and South-
Western Europe) engender typical traits very different from those Christian traditions found 
in the Protestant (Northern Europe) or Orthodox (Eastern Europe and Russia) areas of the 
world. Popular Catholicism is an example of the dialectic between global and local and spe-
cific modernities interwoven in peculiar forms: Latin American’s popular Catholicism has 
some roots in common with Latin/European popular Catholicism (Spain, Portugal, Italy), 
but differs in relevant points; within the Latin American region the Meso-American indig-
enous, syncretic Catholicism (Mexico, Guatemala, Honduras) has distinctive features we 
do not find in the Andean Region of South America (Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia and the north 
of Chile). This indigenous Andean Catholicism has its own specific symbols and identities. 
Popular Christianity in the areas colonized by English-speaking and Protestant cultures 
(areas of the Caribbean and Sub-Saharan Africa) share some features in common with its mix-
ture of tribal rituals and Christian beliefs, but differ greatly from Afro-American Catholicism 
or Afro-American Cults (with syncretic Christian beliefs) as in Umbanda, Candomblé and 
Santería. Catholic popular expressions of Asian countries (the south of India, Sri Lanka, the 
Philippines) share varied elements with Latin American Catholicism, although they also have 
their own traits because of long-term backgrounds and ancient traditions [39].
6. Religion in industrialized western countries
In industrialized central countries—especially in Western Europe—the liberal culture has 
introduced new values and icons and traditional religion is reserved for the few. A growing 
number of people do not profess the orthodox beliefs and do not participate in church activi-
ties and organizations. The traces of Christian influence—in a civilization marked by Western 
Christianity—are still there but they do not have the significance that they did in the past. 
Churches are losing their former influence and power and new suppliers are, as a result, offer-
ing religious or spiritual alternatives and replacements.
Apparently the percentage of atheists and agnostics is growing, however it does not seem to 
be the real trend. The share of the unaffiliated population residing in Europe is projected to 
grow from 12% in 2010 only to 13% in 2050 [25]. However, many of the religiously unaffiliated 
do hold some religious or spiritual beliefs [40]. Following the Pew data, it can be estimated 
that between a third to two-thirds of the unaffiliated population in Western countries believes 
in God or a higher power.
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A growing number of people do not see themselves as church members, but are in search of 
religious or spiritual meaning: they are ‘believers without belonging’ [41]. In everyday life, 
religion continues to be important, perhaps with different meanings and significance. ‘In trag-
edy and disaster, religion is still a major source of symbols, sentiments and ceremonies’ [42].
The theoretical model of the religious market has been used to understand this type of reli-
gious experiences of people in a secularized milieu. The rational choice will induce consumers 
to pick and mix religious items to match their commitment and interest at the modern super-
market of faith [41]. There is not the space to discuss or debate this approach, but we only can 
advance the idea that consumers of religion are not in fact consumers as we currently under-
stand the term: each individual is an active agent of religious production, although framed by 
the official religious codes and cultural regulations of his or her time and society.
New forms of religious or spiritual beliefs and practices are flourishing in the high-tech 
society. Interest in spiritualities by ‘non-religious’ or, better, non-practicing believers [30], 
appears to be growing. Astrology, yoga or other esoteric expressions, New Age or adapted 
Eastern spiritualities (westernized Buddhism or Taoism or similar), native or Afro-American 
or neo-pagan religions are growing movements, networks or even individualistic cults that 
tend to be present within well-trained, well-educated populations working with or handling 
high technologies and seeking self-knowledge, body care, human development, a better qual-
ity of life and harmony with nature and the cosmos.
All these unchurched forms of religions—flourishing also in North America and in Western 
Europe—and in the Western-oriented elites of developing countries of the Global South—
have to be studied in greater detail as forms of ‘new popular religions’. They cover a vast 
range: from metaphysical religions, alternative medicines, psychological spiritualities [43], 
transhumanist cults to auto-secularized Christianity [44].
We have studied for a long while what has been called the ‘believer without religion’ or the 
‘believer my own way’ in Latin American contexts. Although similar in appearance they can-
not be assimilated to Sheilaism [45]—a name for religious ‘do-it-yourselfism’—in industrial-
ized countries. The contextual ethos and culture in each case are different and induce diverse 
types of ‘lived religions’ [46]. The believer ‘my own way’ in Latin American countries is usu-
ally inspired by the distinctive mode of ‘Latino’ spirituality, participating without problem in 
popular cults—which is not an intimate and individualistic way of religiosity. This is also a 
powerful reason why these type of new popular religions expression must be studied under 
the multiple modernities paradigm.
7. Popular religions in eastern Asia and Islamic milieu
Popular religions in East-Asian countries must be the object of more attention. Since statistics 
show very high percentages of non-affiliates in countries like China and Japan. China alone is 
the home to 62% of the world religiously unaffiliated people [40]. The hypothesis that can be 
advanced is that we are facing forms of believers without explicit religious affiliation, hidden 
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from the surface of the numbers. Many of these forms of ‘religiousness’ can mask ‘popular 
religionists’ who are invisible to statistics. The other fact is that in Eastern Asia many tradi-
tional practices are indeed not called “religions”.
The particular interaction of religious traditions with political power—in its changing histori-
cal phases in this cultural area—may also explain the emergence of the ‘unaffiliated’ category, 
which is actually a form of expression of the parallelism that runs between the official and 
canonical religious expressions (used to interact with power and the state) and the various 
forms of popular and folk religions that survive—maybe hidden—in the daily lives of ordi-
nary people.
Popular religion in China has been usually studied under Weberianoptics, the popular cults 
of the masses included multiple gods and sorcerers, with magic having a predominant role 
[47]. Perhaps one of the main misconceptions comes because the Western concept of religion 
does not fully apply to the main Chinese traditions, some of them considered philosophies 
and not religions in China [48].
In modern China, the religious landscape can be studied beginning with the three canoni-
cal religious systems: Confucianism, Buddhism and Daoism [49]. Because these teachings 
often interact with each other the most important ‘lived religion’ freely integrates what it calls 
the ‘three teachings’, producing many and diverse manifestations of popular and syncretic 
religions with its widespread devotion to the ancestors, pilgrimages, shrines and its mul-
tiple mediums and shamans [50]. The revitalization of these Chinese popular religions brings 
about a debate about its relations with Christianity, the politics of the People’s Republic and 
modernization [51].
A similar dynamic—although with different traits—is often found in Japan, Thailand, India 
and many other Eastern Asian countries. Eclectic and syncretic religious expressions are 
found not only in Asian contexts as those promoted by prominent Buddhists in Sri Lanka [52] 
but also in the Muslim world. Zar possession and exorcism cult—probably from Ethiopian 
origin—has spread in North Africa and The Middle East [3] becoming popular in the contem-
porary urban culture of Cairo and other major cities of the Islamic world. A women-only cult, 
its gatherings involve food and musical performances, culminating in ecstatic dancing, last-
ing several nights. These subaltern religious experiences within or alongside Islam evidence 
that modernization, urbanization and migration have opened ways for new popular religious 
forms, which can be considered an alternative to the official and elite religious and cultural 
discourse.
The dialectics official and popular religion can also be found in South Asian contexts where 
kings and clerics often built devotional centers alongside pre-existing indigenous cults. As 
Hefner [3] says “This cosmological accommodation resembles the relationship between 
non-Christian cults and saint veneration in European and Latin American Catholicism” (…) 
Although Protestantism and reformed Catholicism fought these degraded and heretic forms 
of popular and syncretic Christianity, in South and Southeast Asia pre-Hindu or non-Hindu 
cults have survived and even revitalized together with the official great traditions, even after 
elements of them were drawn up into Hindu superstructure.
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In Islamic contexts, the relationship between religions and modernity is quite specific. Gellner 
[53] sketches a quite plausible picture of the relationship between official Islamic religion 
(‘high Islam’) and popular Islamic religion. The existence of a variety of movements and reli-
gious groups within civil society in Muslim countries is part of its multiple modernities and 
has not been sufficiently recognized in the West [16, 54, 55].
The official religion tends toward puritanism and is in the forefront of reforms. Popular Islam 
with its magical beliefs in saints, pilgrimages and shrines, rituals and festivities departs from 
the elites (and therefore takes distance from reformism and of modernity). This type of reli-
giosity has always provided the masses for the leadership of reformers and even in cases for 
the radical jihadists. Since this popular religion has been more likely to externalize its rituals, 
it has sometimes been questioned for having Sufi influences, with its mystical rituals, chants 
and dervish dances.
The accommodation of high Islam with the requirements of modernity is clear and makes 
modernization fully compatible with the reform of Islam, combining in one movement 
reformism and nationalism. Thus religious traditions in history gradually assumed an impor-
tant role in defining ‘authentic’ Muslim modernities [56].
Perhaps the crises caused by the invasions of Afghanistan (in the 1980s by the USSR and then 
subsequently by the USA), the Gulf War and the Iraq War, and then by the chaotic aftermath of 
the Arab Spring (2010 on) have revitalized popular religious movements in Arab and Muslim 
countries—reinvigorating local warlords and tribalism, and with them local Islamic practices.
The contradictions of the modernization process and the search for autonomy vis-à-vis the 
Western colonial or postcolonial powers has accentuated an entire range of Muslim responses, 
from politics to clothes to architecture. ‘In Muslim society postmodernism means a shift to 
ethnic or Islamic identity (not necessarily the same thing and at times opposed to each other) 
as against an imported foreign or Western one; a rejection of modernity (…and…) above all, 
a numbing awareness of the power and pervasive nature of the Western media which are 
perceived as hostile’ ([57], p. 32).
The changes and turmoil brought by the recent neocolonial interventions, the Arab Spring 
and the Middle East civil wars (Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, Yemen) are creating new conditions 
for religious changes and conflicts between factions (Sunni vs. Shiite) and giving more space 
for movements to polarize (fundamentalists vs. liberal and moderates), and creating new con-
ditions for revitalizing Popular Islam.
8. Toward a new sociological approach
Glocalization—as a complex and dynamic process—often revitalize local and popular tra-
ditions under forms that share common trends and in the same dialectical movement it 
gives rises to different and specific expressions and reshapes the religious fields. Religions 
do not simply react against modernization instead they originate diverse responses to the 
modern world. All these religious changes are taking place in a world of nation-states, mass 
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 urbanization, economic specialization, mass and new technological communications and 
migrations that render social borders permeable to transcultural flows. Sociological theory 
is in a continuous effort to be able to improve understanding of these dynamics and current 
transformations.
In recent years, we have many signs that the sociology of religion is regaining the prestige 
that should never have lost. In part this is due to the emergence of the religious phenomenon 
under study. But partly it is because what Jim Beckford requested in his Religion and Advanced 
Industrial Societies [58] is being fulfilled, although gradually [59]. Beckford requested that soci-
ologists of religion come out of their isolation and begin to debate with sociology in full, and 
also requested that theoretical and general sociology take into account religions because it 
‘challenges many taken-for-granted assumptions about their models of modernity’ ([58], p. xi).
The scientific approach to religious phenomena is to be assessed within the framework of 
scientific production as an international system. If we look at the intellectual production of 
the sciences, and social sciences in particular, we will see that there is still social asymmetry 
in the international division of scientific labor. Theories, major issues and even controver-
sies are generated in the North; the intellectual production of the Global South follows 
them, producing abundant empirical or historical analysis, but usually generating scarce 
original theory.
A well-known tradition of postcolonial studies has emphasized the process by which the West 
has ‘invented’ a certain image of the Orient—functional to its interests. This type of image 
allows you to define what the ‘other’ is, nevertheless in terms totally unrelated to what the 
other defines as himself. Said [60] stresses that ‘East’ and ‘West’ operate as opposites, building 
the concept of the ‘East’ as a negative inversion of Western culture.
The production of the social sciences reveals still a postcolonial trend, in fact. The main authors 
in the industrialized countries—English-Speaking or Western European continentals—tend 
to ignore the production of the intellectuals of the Global South (Asia, Latin America, and 
Africa) while the latter still—although with less emphasis than was previously the case—con-
sider intellectual production in the North as their guide and inspiration. This also happens in 
the field of sociology of religion, of course with honorable exceptions.2
A remarkable author that supports the thesis of multiple modernities is the British researcher 
Grace Davie. In an outstanding analysis of religion in contemporary sociology, Sociology of 
Religion [41] she makes a record of studies of religion—first of Britain, then of Europe, then 
globally. She underlines the exceptionalism of religion in Europe with its specific process of 
secularization [63], which cannot be generalized to other continents. But like many sociolo-
gists producing science in the North—very used to reading their own English-speaking or 
European colleagues, trapped in their Eurocentrism—when it comes to analyzing religious 
realities of Latin America she does not quote any native author—who have done valuable 
work, some translated into English—she makes only references to American or English 
authors on Latin America.
2Some examples are Beckford and Demerath III [61] and Cipriani [62].
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The difficulties for analyzing the phenomena of different modernities not only derive from 
the division of intellectual labor but also from the categories and the analytical framework 
from which we start.
Kepel [64] in his study of the so-called fundamentalist movements from the three monotheist 
religions, Christianity, Islam and Judaism, affirmed that each religious culture is developing 
specific ‘truths’ that are giving rise to strong identity claims. Their discourses and practices 
are meaningful and not ‘the product of deregulation of reason’ ([64], p. 26). The point is that 
there are still no appropriate concepts for some religious movements. The notions used to 
understand Muslim events come from Paris or New York. ‘Integrism’ as a concept was born 
in Catholic milieus; ‘fundamentalism’ as a concept was born in Protestant milieus. They have 
only metaphorical, not universal, value. The author explains that these terms are ‘biased’ 
and simplify reality. They are adopted for convenience, given the current Western inability 
to interpret Islamic movements. Yet they hinder knowledge and blur the perception of these 
phenomena as a whole ([64], pp. 15–16).
Many Latin American sociologists have tried and are trying to advance toward the decolo-
nization of sociological knowledge [65–67] and of the sociology of religion in particular [68, 
32]. No better understanding of the local and ‘glocal’ realities can be obtained—in a compre-
hensive perspective—than when local people are involved in knowledge production. Foreign 
observers need to enhance objectivity—epistemic intersubjectivity—but local knowledge is 
better fitted to establishing connotations and decoding meanings.
As the Asian sociologist Syed Farid Alatas [69] has suggested, attention to local intellectuals 
such as the ones he examines, José Rizal (1861–1896) from the Philippines and Ibn Khaldun 
(1332–1406), an Arab from the north of Africa, can open up an alternative research agenda 
other than the Western-oriented one. It reverses the subject–object dichotomy in which the 
knowledge in social thought and social theory are generally derived from Western European 
and North American white males, and replaces the domination of European-derived catego-
ries and concepts with a multicultural coexistence. Spikard has been making inroads in this 
direction with forays into the possibility of a Confucian sociology of religion [70] and an 
Islamic sociology of the same [71].
There are multiple religious transformations in the world today. They are a challenge to the 
analytical and theoretical frameworks of mainstream sociology. The evolution of sociology—
especially the sociology of religion—is marked by the ‘fathers’ (Marx, Weber, Durkheim, 
Troeltsch, Mauss, Simmel, James) all of them writing in Western contexts [72]. So, it is not 
strange that many of the sociological controversies about religion have been around the 
Western pattern of an ‘evolutionary’ framework: modern societies will be secularized, so 
modernization processes will be brought—among other variables—by secularization. These 
theoretical statements were displaced by the criticism of secularization theories from the mid-
1970s onwards. But the implicit framework is still there.
The fact that this premise has been taken as normative in the theories of modernization and 
then the theories of development has had huge implications for sociological theory in gen-
eral and for sociology of religion theories in particular. Thus Western-oriented approach has 
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gone hand in hand with Christian-oriented and even Christian church-oriented approaches 
[72] and they have polluted current approaches to the cultural and religious phenomenon 
worldwide.
As stated some years ago [72], there is an agenda for the ‘de-Westernization’ of sociology 
and the need to determine new analytical categories. Changes that have taken place in recent 
decades in globalization with its multiple modernities’ outcomes have transformed religious 
fields as previously understood by sociological theory. ‘This calls for a revision of concepts. 
For the “de-Westernization” of global religious reality forces us to rethink once again those 
sociological categories that are grounded in the experience, tradition and structure of Western 
religion’ ([72], p. 71).
In this new multidisciplinary and intercultural effort, new ideas coming from the South are 
welcomed. And the South must be seen more as an epistemic and intellectual way of seeing 
things than a geographical or geopolitical place. The South here means a different and alterna-
tive view to the hegemonic Western, colonialist, white, male view of reality.
9. Concluding remarks
Contrary to the classical theses of secularization, the contemporary world is not witnessing 
the inevitable decline of religions. Religions are being transformed. As we have seen, this is 
evident in the various expressions of popular religions in Asia, the Middle East, Africa and 
Latin America. The case of the “secularized” societies of the West is specific in its own and 
cannot be taken as a model, neither empirical nor theoretical and less in evolutionary terms.
As we have said, the theory of multiple modernities permits us to understand why homoge-
neous and hegemonic modernization models—Eurocentric—are in crisis. Davie [63] herself 
talks about the uniqueness of the European case in terms of its own religious and seculariza-
tion processes, which cannot be generalized. Otherwise as there is a European case—which 
has served for a long time as an exemplary model, although erroneously—there are also the 
Asian, the Arab, the Latin American, the African and the North American ‘religious transfor-
mation’ cases.
Each one has its particular historical, cultural, sociopolitical and religious traditions and pres-
ent processes. Certainly there are some common traits within a global process of religious 
transformations, but what is dominant is the crystallizing of different religious modernities 
within broad cultural/civilizational patterns—whether near to or far away from Western 
European civilization and Western Christianity.
The cross-cuttings between the dynamics of modernization processes and local/regional tra-
ditions and histories are producing many more transformations than we imagined, both in 
the cultural and the religious sphere. A long durée perspective, as suggested by Braudel [73], 
combining sociology and history must be put in place. Intercultural processes have increased 
in these multiple contexts (and so social conflicts [74]). The interweaving of old and new 
religious traditions is accentuating interculturality and is generating great conditions for the 
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emergence of new types of syncretism [75] and/or sociocultural and even material (and vio-
lent) conflicts. The consequence is the development of not one pattern of religious evolution 
and change, but multiple cultural, institutional and religious patterns within societies that 
have a specific and distinctively form of modernity of their own [8].
Modernizing theories posited the process of secularization as a positive path toward prog-
ress. In its radical perception, the rationalization of life—assisted by the scientific-techno-
logical society—will make religions fade and eventually disappear. These theories assumed 
that religion would inevitably diminish in terms of its role and influence in modern society. 
Meanwhile theories of postmodernism preached the crisis of modern reason and the multi-
plication of narratives that would end with the mega-narratives of the past. Therefore, along 
with the progressive dissolution of the subject, all religious legitimization would tend to fade.
Thus, these common sense ideas (and even classical frameworks of some sociology) applied 
to religious phenomena are not well fitted to understanding at least two great current reli-
gious dynamics of the world today: (a) the increasingly different paths that we can find in 
religious diversifications and the multiplication of popular religion and spiritual expressions 
within multiple modernities; (b) the increasing importance of emotions and bodily dimen-
sions within religious symbols, icons and practices of the masses in the different geo-cultural 
areas—and religious fields—of the world today.
A full understanding of religious pluralism and of the multiple religious types of transforma-
tions—including new religious movements, new forms of the world’s religious traditions and 
multiple popular religions worldwide, not only in the West and in the North—must be an 
intercultural [76, 77] effort that requires new epistemic fundaments.
Many sociologists have advanced or proposed the theory of rational choice to analyze the 
growing religious pluralism and the various forms of individualized religions. Following my 
arguments, the rational choice paradigm has to be considered a flawed perspective because 
religion has to be understood as a unidimensional, rationalistic and monocultural reality. It 
certainly is more applicable to Western Christianity, as Sharot [78] has shown, and much less 
relevant and pertinent for analyzing Eastern religions and magic/popular religions because 
they are not built on rationalized ways of living, as in the case for Western Christianity. The 
rationality of their social actions follows another logic [32] that the rational choice theory 
does not address, and further it is based on the congregational-based Christian religion of the 
West—as we have said—and not on popular or ethnic religions, which Buddhism, Hinduism, 
Daoism, and other Eastern, African or folk Latino-American religions have as their base. 
Religions and spiritual experiences in the multiple modernities paradigm must be assessed in 
a cross-cultural and from an intercultural perspective.
Theories of religion that attempt to build up a body of transcultural, universalistic generaliza-
tions, beginning with basic axioms of human one-dimensional rationality, will fail. A new 
sociological approach means making a great epistemological effort to overcome the problems 
of the analytical focus based on one type of rationality, mainly the Western-oriented type of 
rational action. Religious and spiritual pluralism in the globalized world, with its diverse and 
multiple manifestations, is challenging that effort.
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